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Abstract

In this thesis, I examine the extent to which the media censorship of the Pinochet dictatorship,
which ended over 20 years ago, continues to influence Chilean public opinion and policy today.
The dictatorship’s control, penetration and censorship of the press in the 1970s and 1980s
appears to have created a lack of pluralism in the media that helped the dictatorship retain
political power for 17 years. However, it seems that the dictatorship’s influence did not end with
its reign and that this lack of media pluralism still exists today and could be correlated with a
widespread conservatism in Chilean public opinion.
After providing a brief history of Chile and the dictatorship’s immediate impact on the
media, I present a qualitative analysis that compares El Mercurio, a conservative and prominent
Chilean newspaper, and La Nación, a newspaper that historically has served as the government
mouthpiece, to determine if both the 1973 and present press have conservative tendencies that
could impact readers. To discover if the findings are unique to Chile, I compare the results to
those of the Argentine press and indicate that Argentina has more media pluralism and less
widespread conservatism than Chile, regardless of the two nation’s similarities. Lastly, to
determine if the dictatorship’s censorship has had a tangible impact on Chilean public opinion
today, I quantitatively analyze media framing bias through cross-tabulations of Chilean ideology
and trends in news consumption. Based on the comparative content analysis of Chilean
newspapers both during and after the dictatorship, the juxtaposition of these findings to trends in
Argentine media, and the quantitative analysis of the relationship between Chilean media and
trends in public opinion, I conclude that, while the dictatorship’s censorship still influences
content in the press today, there are other factors that may be more significant in influencing
Chilean public opinion and policy.
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Executive Summary
This paper aims to discover if the 1973-1990 Chilean dictatorship had a significant and
lasting influence on the Chilean press and, subsequently, Chilean public opinion. Before and
during the military dictatorship, Pinochet and his followers employed numerous propaganda and
censorship tactics that resulted in a lack of press freedom. As a result, little ideological diversity
proliferated among the media within Chilean society, which created a conservative consensus
among the information disseminated. Furthermore, limits on the oppositional and leftist press
forced many outlets either to close or to sell to one of the two large conservative media
conglomerates that still dominate most Chilean outlets today.
Even among the newspapers that were permitted to circulate during the dictatorship, evidence
suggests that selection and presentation bias may have had a significant impact on Chilean public
opinion during the time, thus allowing the dictatorship to retain power for as long as it did. By
comparing a pre-coup issue of El Mercurio, the most widely circulated and conservative
newspaper in Chile, to a pre-coup issue of La Nación, the historically government-operated
newspaper, I determine that both left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers disseminated what
the Groeling study defines as “biased” information. However, due to the conservative El
Mercurio’s higher circulation and credibility, it likely had more of an impact than other
newspapers.
To determine if a bias in framing and word choice still exists among the Chilean press today,
I compare two current issues of these same newspapers and conclude that, when using
definitions of media bias from the Groeling study, El Mercurio appears to hold a slight
conservative bias today, while La Nación appears to have become politically neutral. While there
are a number of factors that could not be accounted for in this study, such as the context of
political events and changes in technology, this conclusion indicates that, although small, the
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dictatorship’s control of the media still impacts the type of information that Chileans receive
today.
In comparing Chilean media with Argentine media, a country that experienced a similar
dictatorship, I indicate that, qualitatively, the impact of conservative bias and framing in Chile
appears to be more significant than that of Argentina. In doing so, I create an opportunity for
further research analyzing the effects of other Latin American dictatorships on the press to
examine whether or not Chile is similar or the exception.
After determining that a conservative leaning existed and still exists within the content of
Chilean newspapers, I hypothesize that the dictatorship’s impact on the press in the 1970s and
1980s is correlated with a more conservative public opinion today. I perform a quantitative
analysis using survey data from Latinobarómetro to examine the relationship between the
Chileans that choose newspapers as a way to obtain political information and how they identify
on the left-right ideological scale. By comparing these results to Argentine media and to other
media platforms, it appears that Chileans have more conservatism, regardless of what media
outlet they use to inform themselves and regardless of the frequency with which they use their
preferred media outlet. However, when controlling for other possible reasons that a conservative
public opinion exists in Chile, I identify that the press may not be a statistically significant factor.
This result could be due to a number of reasons, one of which is simply that the press is not as
important as education or income, but it could also be that newspaper readers have become more
conservative and then, disseminate their views to non-readers who also become more
conservative, thus affecting overall public opinion.
While, in conclusion, I still maintain that the dictatorship had an influence on the press and
aided in the creation of a conservative media, I acknowledge that the extent of the dictatorship’s
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effects today could be attributed to a variety of factors that are difficult to isolate and that more
research is needed in order to determine the full impact of the dictatorship on the Chilean media
and society today.

Chapter 1: Historical Background
In this chapter, I present historical information about September 1973 and the political, social
and economic environment in Chile leading up to the Pinochet dictatorship in order to provide
the context for the current media environment and indicate how it may influence public opinion.
I. Independence
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Starting with its declaration of independence from Spain in 1810, Chile experienced
extensive political and party conflict that has had lasting effects on its society. From 1810 to
1814, military aristocrat José Miguel Carrera ruled the nation during the Patria Vieja (Old
Country) and set the precedent for military involvement in the government (Astudillo, 2013).
However, his dictatorial way of governing caused controversy and tension, and prompted a state
of anarchy and war known as the Reconquista (Reconquest), in which Spanish loyalists tried to
reclaim control (Astudillo, 2013).
In 1817, Chilean nationalists defeated the loyalists in the Battle of Chacabuco and established
the Patria Nueva (New Country) with an official declaration of independence (Astudillo, 2013).
Conservative Bernardo O’Higgins was the president of the new nation, but he had a similar
authoritarian governing style to Carerra and, as a result, there was much discontent and unrest.
O’Higgins was forced into exile and, once again, Chile went into years of anarchy and turmoil
(Paredes, 2013).
II. Constitution
In 1833, wealthy businessmen and dictator Diego Portales implemented a formal constitution
and republic (Paredes, 2013). Conservative Portales valued peace, order and control and, among
other things, he was able to maintain his power through the censorship of the press. His
constitution gave extensive power to the executive branch, which was run by a wealthy
oligarchy, and he set up a civil militia that supported the military authorities in Chilean
government, which is a move that would influence Chilean government for centuries (Paredes,
2013). Furthermore, while the Chilean Congress created by the new constitution was supposed to
check the power of the executive branch, it was not given any significant capabilities and was
dominated by elites who often participated in bribes and fraud (Paredes, 2013).

8

It was not until the 1920s that middle and lower classes gained enough power to create a
coalition and elect a more liberal president, Alexander Alessandri. However, the traditionalist
and conservative military staged a double coup that threw Chile into political chaos yet again so
that, between the years of 1924 and 1932, Chile had a span of ten dictators (Paredes, 2013).
III. Allende
It was just after this time that the position of a Chilean centrist political party became an
important factor. Scully (1992) states that Chilean centrist parties, due to coalitions created
among the working and middle classes, gained power and influence during three important
junctures, the last of which occurred during the election of Eduardo Frei in 1964. Frei
implemented far more liberal programs than any previous ruler; however, he was a member of a
centrist party and many members of the left wing felt that his reforms did not reach far enough
(Paredes, 2013). Therefore, in 1970, socialist and communist parties joined forces to elect
Salvador Allende, a member of the Popular Unity, to the presidency.
Allende’s policies were more leftist than any other previous Chilean president. In part due to
support from the Christian Democratic Party, the centrist party, Allende created a platform based
on the nationalization of industries, the division of the economy into both public and private
sectors and the advancement of union and worker rights (Scully, 1992). However, his policies
posed a threat to the Chilean elite and to U.S. economic and political interests, which prompted a
strong opposition movement.
As Allende’s presidency progressed, inflation and unemployment increased and the economy
plummeted, which fueled the opposition. Even those who had previously supported him, namely
the centrist Christian Democratic Party that dominated Congress, withdrew support and made it
difficult for him to achieve success (Scully, 1992). In fact, Valenzuela (1978) argues that the
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recurring loss of support of the centrist party throughout Chilean history, which is what
happened during Allende’s presidency, has been the key contributor to the instability of Chilean
democracy and consistent dictatorial leadership.
IV. The Dictatorship
By 1972, inflation had skyrocketed and the economy was suffering so significantly that there
was an eruption of social and political discontent in the form of strikes and protests (Astudillo,
2013). As a reaction, the head of the army, General Augusto Pinochet, led a military coup and
took control of the nation on September 11, 1973. At the time, many members of the public were
relieved that order and peace were restored (Astudillo, 2013). However, it soon became clear that
this order and peace would come at the expense of personal liberties. For the next 17 years, Chile
was under the harsh military rule of the Pinochet dictatorship, which, among other things,
entailed curfew, a new constitution, extensive censorship of the press, the closure of a national
congress, and large-scale torture and execution of the opposition (Paredes, 2013).
In 1988, Pinochet lost the plebiscite due to bad publicity from human rights violations and
discontent with the struggling economy. While democracy was restored with the election of
Patricio Alywin in 1989, Pinochet continued to hold a key governmental position, serving as the
Commander-in-Chief of the army for a number of years and, later, as a senator and top-level
advisor until his death in 2006 (Paredes, 2013). From 1990 to 2001, centrist democratically
elected governments held power, but due to Pinochet’s continued influence, Chilean government
and society did not change much during this “transitional” period, and power remained
concentrated in the hands of the conservative members of the previous regime.
V. Today
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In 2006, Michelle Bachelet of the Socialist Party was elected and, after forgoing the 2010
term while a more conservative Sebastian Piñera served, she was recently reelected to a new
term in 2014. However, since the Pinochet dictatorship, there have been few major policy
reforms that have altered Chilean society. For example, the nation is still governed using the
1980 Constitution written by the Pinochet regime and Chile still remains one of the most
privatized countries in the world, with transportation, water and social security all privately
owned (Mallén, 2013). Due to the ongoing historical impact of conservative dictatorships and the
lack of significant policy reforms, I hypothesize that the media and public opinion have also
experienced lasting effects from the Pinochet regime.
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Chapter 2: Chilean Media and the Dictatorship
In light of understanding the historical context of Chilean government and society as a whole,
the purpose of this chapter is to provide specific history and information about the newspapers
and other media outlets in Chile and their role in the dictatorship to provide the context to
understand the media climate today.
I. The Allende Years
Before the 1970s, the Chilean press was relatively heterogeneous (Baltra, 1988). While there
were ample social and economic divisions in Chilean society that permitted the wealthy to
dominate most outlets of communication with education and political clout, there were laws in
the 19th century that protected the freedom of the press. This allowed many different businesses
to publish newspapers and magazines, from the communist El Siglo to the far-right El Mercurio,
and promoted an open marketplace of ideas (Insunza, 1999). However, in 1970, this
heterogeneous environment began to change radically with the election of socialist candidate
Salvador Allende and subsequent intervention by the United States.
During the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union were at the height of the Cold
War. Tensions were high and the United States wanted to do everything in its power to ensure
that communism did not extend into its own hemisphere. Even though the United States
experienced success with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the loss of
Cuba to communism and the struggles in Vietnam were fresh in the minds of the Nixon
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administration (Kornbluh, 2003). Therefore, the United States saw the election of socialist
Allende as a huge threat to its sovereignty because Chile is located within its same hemisphere
and the election came at a time when the Nixon administration was desperate to reassert its
power and reaffirm that its democratic ideology was morally correct (Kornbluh, 2003).
Essentially, the United States’ principal fear was that Chile would become a communist country
and the “domino effect” would ensue, meaning other Latin America nations would also fall to
communism, helping the Soviet Union win the ideological war.
In order to prevent this from occurring, the Nixon administration launched its own internal
propaganda efforts in a campaign known as the “Red Scare” to create a consensus against
communism among its people (Kornbluh, 2003). It then moved its concentration to other nations.
For example, due to the ideological and economic threat of Allende’s presidency, particularly the
potential nationalization of the copper industry, the Nixon administration launched anticommunist propaganda campaigns in Chile that greatly influenced media coverage in the months
and years leading up to the coup (Kornbluh, 2003).
While the United States pumped thousands of dollars into a variety of communications outlets
in Chile to support its anti-Allende campaign, the most famous case of its covert support is its
partnership with the newspaper El Mercurio (Dougnac & Lagos, 2009). El Mercurio was
founded by Pedro Félix Vicuña in 1827 and, shortly after, was acquired by the conservative and
wealthy Agustín Edwards family, which still owns it today. Known as the oldest national and
largely conservative newspaper in Chile, El Mercurio of the late 1960s and early 1970s enjoyed
a daily readership of more than 120,000 during the week and about 350,000 on Sundays, which
was more than any other Chilean newspaper of its time (Doungac & Lagos, 2009). Additionally,
during the time of the dictatorship, the Edwards family had strong relations with influential
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people in the Nixon Administration, such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which, besides
the fact that El Mercurio was known to be conservative and had a widespread circulation, made
the newspaper a logical partner for the United States’ campaign (Kornbluh, 2003).
As early as 1967, El Mercurio began receiving funds from the CIA to publish subjective
articles, editorials and photos battling Marxist ideas (Kornbluh, 2003). When Allende assumed
the presidency, the CIA increased these funds and launched an overall propaganda effort against
Allende, thus setting the stage for the military coup (Kornbluh 2003). In total, the CIA provided
more than one million dollars to Edwards for propaganda in El Mercurio and at one point the
relationship between the two parties was so close that, in the instance that Edwards asked for
more money, President Nixon personally allotted it (Kornbluh, 2003).
El Mercurio was not the only newspaper that spoke out against the Allende administration in
the years leading up to the military coup, but there were several others that condemned Allende
and blamed him for the problems in the Chilean economy. For example, La Tercera, a centerright newspaper founded in 1950 with a total readership of approximately 200,000 during the
1970s, also published information that painted negative connotations of socialism during this
time (Baltra, 1988). In fact, pre-coup issues of both El Mercurio and La Tercera had examples of
word bias, such as the repeated use of the phrase “marxistas extremos” in La Tercera when
referring to anyone who supported leftist ideology. While Marxism is generally accepted as an
“extreme” view, this phrase and others were often placed in negative contexts in the conservative
newspapers, which caused readers to associate Marxism with negative images. Examples include
headlines like “Allende industria donde trabajan los asesinos” (“Allende industry where the
murderers work”) or “El falso socialismo,” (“The false socialism”), which both place negative
words with actions of Allende or the ideology that he embodies.
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Under normal circumstances, the language bias may not have proven to be especially
significant because of the ability of leftist news outlets to speak out with equally “biased”
support for Allende. However, while the circulation of La Tercera was close to 200,000 and El
Mercurio equally as high, the circulation of all the leftist papers together in the years leading up
to the coup only totaled about 250,000 (Landis, 1977). Therefore, the ideas of the left were not
distributed as widely as the ideas of the right, which could be attributed to a number of factors.
One possibility is that due to the stagnant economy during the final years of Allende’s
presidency, these papers did not have the financial resources to produce the same number of
issues as they could in previous years and may not have been receiving covert support like some
of the right-wing newspapers (Landis, 1977). Another possibility could be that there were simply
fewer Chilean journalists that shared a liberal ideology (Landis, 1977). Chilean universities are
very expensive and not easily accessible to lower classes, which means that many of those who
attend are wealthy and conservative (Paredes, 2013). Besides creating an even larger division
between social classes, the education system perpetuates the power of an elite oligarchy because
it makes social change incredibly difficult and causes the elite discourse to become the public
discourse (Dermota, 2002). In the time leading up to the dictatorship, Allende supporters were
often from lower classes and did not have accessible education or tools to disseminate and
communicate their ideas, while many of the educated journalism students of the time likely held
a conservative ideology and pursued work at newspapers that shared this ideology, such as El
Mercurio (Cole, 1996). Due to this educational divide, it would have been easier and more
common for the educated, conservative people to use the media to disseminate and communicate
their ideas, support for their ideology and, thus maintain the power of the elite discourse, which
could help explain why El Mercurio enjoyed a higher circulation and readership.
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II. The Media and the Coup
On September 12, 1973, the day after the military coup, General Augusto Pinochet declared
a law that said the press, radio and television could not release any information to the public that
was not approved by the armed forces and, additionally, gave the government the ability to
intervene if necessary (Baltra, 1988). This law was shortly followed by another one, nicknamed
“Operation Silence,” which declared that only two newspapers, El Mercurio y La Tercera, could
circulate until further notice (Dougnac & Lagos, 2009). Essentially, these two right-wing
newspapers were the only communication outlets permitted to cover the military coup of
September 11, 1973 and, to do so, they used language that indicated it was the military’s moral
obligation to overthrow Allende, which suggests that Pinochet understood the importance of the
media in seizing and maintaining power.
III. Censorship
To maximize the power of the media to his advantage, Pinochet created many censorship
laws and financially supported conservative newspapers, such as taking over for the United
States in financing El Mercurio. Additionally, the dictatorship closed many newspapers that had
written in favor of the Popular Unity and Allende, such as El Siglo, Última Hora, Puro Chile,
Clarín, El Diario Color de Concepción, Mundo, Onda, Paloma, Ramona, Punto Final, Mayoría
and more (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004). The only oppositional
newspapers that were permitted to circulate were Qué Pasa, Ercilla, Las Últimas Noticias y La
Segunda (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004). Even so, many of these
newspapers did not have the funds to continue and, even when they did publish, often suffered
from the effects of self-censorship (Monckeberg, 2009).
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In this paper, I refer to self-censorship in two ways. The first is editors and journalists
monitoring the message of the newspaper due to the fear of being shut down or suffering a worse
punishment, such as that put in place by the Law of the Security of the Interior, which gave the
government the power to “restrict” anyone who spoke poorly about the President of the
Republic, the state, the armed forces, the court, or the regime in general (Monckeberg, 2009). In
other words, talking badly about the Pinochet regime often resulted in torture or worse.
The other core idea of self-censorship involves the readers. Due to the low-circulation of
leftist newspapers, many of the prominent and disseminated ideas in 1970s society were based in
conservative ideology. Often times, those who had a different point of view had fear of sharing
their thoughts and opinions in case of rejection by their peers, or, in the times of the dictatorship,
fear of punishment and torture (Insunza, 2009). This form of self-censorship also could have had
other effects, such as a stifling of overall creativity and innovation, because readers did not get
exposed to different ideas or new information and, therefore, had no new ideas to share.
Newspapers were not the only media outlets affected by censorship laws and selfcensorship, and radio stations, television stations and magazines also suffered. Pinochet assumed
control of all public and governmental channels of communication to spread support for the
dictatorship (Halpern, & Ball-Rokeach, 1993). For example, while there were about 200 radio
stations in support of the dictatorship, there were only four that could talk out “against” it
(Landis, 1977). Another example is Pinochet’s support for the magazine Juventud, which
attempted to sway youth to support the dictatorship and the ideology of the right by highlighting
the achievements of past dictators, such as Diego Portales. In fact, Pinochet even went so far as
to write a propaganda book, El Libro Blanco, to justify his actions during the military coup and
gain support for his regime (Paredes 2013).
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Throughout the dictatorship, Pinochet created many other censorship laws in the Constitution
of 1980 and in the “Fondo Ministro Interior” (“Interior Ministry Background”), which is an
outline of the internal agenda of the regime. He even created censorship offices that made it
easier for the government to target those who did not obey (Monckeberg, 2009). While the law
did not explicitly permit the government to kill or torture those who dissented, many journalists,
both Chileans and foreigners, were killed or exiled for their alternative views. A majority of the
time the government denied playing a role in these deaths and disappearances, but if evidence
forced a justification, the administration would reference sections of the censorship laws.
According to the Valech Commission, the regime imprisoned over 230 journalists and killed at
least 23 during its reign (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004). This
constant fear of death and torture was another element of the self-censorship that dominated the
creation of content and limited the pluralism of ideas.
IV. Fighting the Censorship
Despite the censorship, there were also many media outlets that made it their mission to
speak out against Pinochet and fight for a change. This backlash was not extremely visible until
the 1980s, when Pinochet’s human rights violations were becoming common knowledge to the
global eye. To avoid foreign interference and social unrest, Pinochet decreased his use of torture
and lightened some of the censorship restrictions, which gave more oppositional outlets the
opportunity to publish. For example, La Última Hora and The Clinic both published editorials
and articles that attacked Pinochet and supported cultural movements against the dictatorship,
such as “No+,” which encouraged the Chilean public to vote against Pinochet in the plebiscite of
1988 (Sorensen, 2009).
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Furthermore, many journalists, like Mónica González Mujica and Patricia Collyer, began to
investigate torture and human rights violations and expose the realities of the dictatorship to the
Chilean public (“Chilean journalist,” 2010). With more voices and opinions in the public sphere,
the resistance to Pinochet became stronger, indicating that the press may not only be one of the
reasons that the dictatorship began, but also may be one of the primary reasons that it ended,
which provides a great opportunity for further research. However, having said this,
aforementioned factors, such as fear of foreign intervention and increased attention to human
rights violations, may have been more significant influences in ending the dictatorship because
they may have been influential in Pinochet’s decision to lessen censorship laws, which enabled
the press to speak out. On the other hand, it is also possible that Pinochet lessened the restrictions
for other reasons, such as thinking that he had a strong enough hold over the country to allow the
press to communicate, which would indicate that the press did have an important role in the
demise of the dictatorship.
V. Effects Today
With that being said, the dictatorship’s censorship still had serious implications for the nation,
not only in the press, but also in other industries and in augmenting the social and economic
division. While Africa may be the poorest continent in the world, South America has the largest
socio-economic divide, which is reflected in today’s concentration of ownership among media
outlets that has roots in the dictatorship (Bucciferro, 2012). As previously mentioned, censorship
laws caused many publications and media outlets to close due to lack of liberty, funds and
readers. Consequently, the successful conservative media companies that were approved by
Pinochet could afford to buy the smaller publications and form conglomerates. Not only were the
heads of these companies conservative, but they also often had close relations with the
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government, which, over time, caused the formation of a conservative oligarchy, or more
precisely, a duopoly, among the communications outlets in Chile (Monckeberg, 2009). One of
these conglomerate heads is the aforementioned Agustín Edwards, owner of the right-wing El
Mercurio and, now, approximately twenty other newspapers and forty radio stations throughout
Chile (Monckeberg, 2009). The other is Alvaro Saieh, owner of the conglomerate Copesa, which
owns La Tercera, many magazines and other newspapers, banks and even a chain of
supermarkets and department stores (Monckeberg, 2009).
Ironically enough, both of the newspapers that had monetary funding during the dictatorship
are owned by these conservative conglomerates and are still prominent news sources today.
While Chile currently has approximately 60 circulating newspapers, which is significantly more
than during the dictatorship, approximately half of these are owned by one of the two
conservative conglomerates (“Chile Press,” 2014). This lack of pluralism in Chilean press
suggests that a possible financial and ideological consensus exists among the highest and richest
class, often the same people who had the benefits of education and are influential in the
government, to control the diffusion and content of the information in the press (Monckeberg,
2009). It also suggests that, due to the dictatorship and its censorship, much of today’s news is
coming from the same sources, meaning the rich and conservative members who own the
conglomerates, which not only contributes to the growing division between the social and
economic classes, but also slows the spread of diverse ideas and information (Monckeberg,
2009). In fact, Chilean laws and norms appear to reinforce this lack of pluralism because the
media industry is one of the least regulated by Chilean law, which gives the wealthy and
influential elite free reign to control the industry (Mastrini & Becerra, 2011).
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Today, El Mercurio still enjoys a large daily readership and a Sunday circulation of
approximately 300,000 and La Tercera’s daily circulation has increased to about 210,000
readers. A recent study that found that newspaper circulation in Latin America increased 3.5%
from 2008 to 2012, which indicates that many Latin Americans still prefer to read the news in
print even with the increase of digital outlets (“Marketing Charts,” 2013). In fact, the influence
of the press during the dictatorship and its lasting relevance today is one of the reasons why I
chose to focus this paper on the effects of the dictatorship specifically on the press and,
subsequently, public opinion.
Due to the large period of time my study attempts to account for, it is also important to
consider some of the general theories concerning media usage in Latin America in order to relate
the effect of the dictatorship on Chilean media to today’s increasingly technological
environment. Numerous studies have demonstrated that due to fear established during the
dictatorship, many Chileans do not trust the media, the government, or even each other
(Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1979). This is not only a trend seen in Chile during
the dictatorship, but even today, all over the world, citizens are trusting the media less and less
(Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011). Since the mass media is the primary way that people receive
information, a lack of trust in this institution could be a significant factor when analyzing its
effect on public opinion. For example, currently, the agenda-setting theory, which suggests that
the media chooses what issues are important in society, is a commonly accepted theory of the
role of the media in Chilean society because the politics of media ownership allow a
concentrated and relatively homogenous elite group to control and frame the messages to the
public (Monckeberg, 2009). However, a combination of increased technology and general lack
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of trust may make this theory less applicable in the future for younger generations and change
the level of impact the press has on public opinion (Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011).
To illustrate, another study found that, due to the lack of trust, younger generations are
increasingly not affiliating themselves with political parties and, instead, are going to social
media outlets to express their opinions (Valenzuela, Arriagada & Sherman, 2012). When
forming opinions, younger generations are more influenced by friends and family than by the
media and, instead of bringing these opinions to the polls, they are using technological activism
as a way to change society (Valenzula, Arriagada & Sherman, 2012). In partnership with
increased globalization, these increased outlets for expression could have interesting implications
for the future of Chilean politics and the amount of power that the press will actually have in
future generations and, therefore, are important to keep in mind when reading this paper.
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Chapter 3: El Mercurio vs. La Nación
Having discovered that, of all the media outlets, the printed press is the outlet that both
played a prominent role during the Chilean dictatorship and is still a relevant force today, in this
chapter, I perform a qualitative analysis of the content of certain newspapers to affirm that bias
exists. This chapter examines, compares and contrasts both a current and a 1973 edition of El
Mercurio, which I have identified as the prominent conservative newspaper, to discover if there
is evidence that suggests it undermined the Allende administration and helped promote the coup.
In order to discover the magnitude of these findings, I juxtapose my findings to a similar analysis
I perform with both the current and 1973 editions of La Nación, the state-controlled newspaper
that has historically served as the government mouthpiece.
I. Research Design
I chose El Mercurio and La Nación as the newspapers for my study because, in addition to
the fact that both were permitted to circulate throughout the dictatorship, El Mercurio had the
largest circulation of conservative papers during the time and La Nación was a liberal paper
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before the coup and a conservative paper during the regime, which was the closest long-term
outlet contrasting El Mercurio and a good comparison to measure bias.
The reason that I chose to only compare one day of coverage over a forty-year period was to
enable a closer look at the actual content of these newspapers, without having too much data to
compare. When choosing these dates, I recognize that Chilean society has changed substantially
from 1973 to today and that there are no current events or protests equal to that of those in
September 1973. I understand that, by simply comparing one issue from only two newspapers,
my analysis does not have the external validity that it would have if I had used every El
Mercurio and La Nación issue from 1973 and then compared them to each issue in 2013. If I had
done this, my analysis would have more widespread applicability and given a more realistic
picture into the full effects of any press bias, but the data would have been vast and I would not
have been able to delve into the actual content of the articles to see differences in framing and
use of code words. Furthermore, even if I had attempted a larger analysis, the passage of time,
innovations in technology and the difference in world events would have impacted results. While
there have been studies that examine the immediate effects of the dictatorship on press and
public opinion in the 1970s to 1990s, there is little research that tries to relate the dictatorship’s
control of the media to today, which is what my study attempts to do and why I chose such a
large time period.
In order to correctly analyze these newspapers, I need to define my use of the term “bias” in
this paper. When discussing media bias, I am referring to the definition created in Tim
Groeling’s 2013 study that media bias is a “portrayal of reality that is significantly and
systematically (not randomly) distorted” (Groeling, 2013, p. 133). Under this broad definition,
there are many areas in which something could be biased, from race to geography to income.
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Furthermore, Groeling suggests that there are two different types of bias. There is selection bias,
in which the outlet has the power to choose what stories it covers, and presentation bias, in which
the content of the stories is manipulated, such as through tone, framing or length, to elicit a
certain reaction (Groeling, 2013, p. 134).
Having defined my use of the term “bias,” I still believe it is still important to stress that
news can be seen as inherently biased due to a number of different factors, such as the identity of
the writer or outlet. For example, in the time leading up to the military coup, leftist papers, such
as the communist El Siglo, could be considered biased because they often staunchly supported
Allende and leftist ideology. Yet, as I previously mentioned, El Siglo, although biased, did not
enjoy the same widespread circulation as El Mercurio before and during the dictatorship, which
is why I have argued that the bias present in El Mercurio had a more significant impact on
Chilean public opinion than that of leftist newspapers like El Siglo (Garretón, 1999).
Furthermore, since the term “media bias” is difficult to define, it is more challenging to
perform a valid study to measure the impact of bias. Doing so would require subjectivity in
defining what is biased, and subsequently, would be biased itself. Therefore, in this paper and
using the Groeling study, I created a research design to identify bias in the newspapers.
While the articles chosen for this study could also be products of content and selection bias
from Groeling’s study, I chose them systematically to lessen this possibility. The articles
analyzed in each issue are from the same days, September 1, 1973 and September 1, 2013, and
are from the same sections of the newspaper, specifically the comparison of front-page articles,
to ensure they would be similar and have similar importance. However, as previously mentioned,
the events of September 2013 are not equivalent to any of the events and build up to September
11, 1973, which contributes to a difference in coverage.
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Although I only deeply analyzed the diction of the front-page articles, I compared the
content and topics of articles throughout the entire issues of the newspapers to determine the
overall tendency of bias and attempt to achieve as much objectivity as possible. This allowed me
to analyze the overall tone and framing to determine how many articles were for or against a
certain ideology. Again, this research only presents a small one-day analysis of possible bias in
these newspapers, which means it may not have widespread applicability, but it will nevertheless
aid in the understanding of how the coup and the dictatorship affected the press and public
opinion.
To measure the selection and presentation bias in the articles, I identified criteria for the
information that would appear in the headlines, topics and language of biased articles. For 1973,
I identified articles as leaning conservative if the topics were critical of Allende and socialism or
praised the military and leaning liberal if they defended Allende, praised socialism or discussed
successes of the current government. I looked for words with strong connotations, either positive
or negative, and analyzed them within the context to determine their impact. For example, both
sides tended to use code words, such as “extremists” or “radicals,” but in different ways. Since I
chose to only analyze one day of coverage, I had the advantage of understanding the context of
these code words and what each side wanted to convey when using them, instead of relying on a
surface systematic method that could successfully identify code words, but could also miss their
importance in context.
For 2013, I identified articles as having a conservative bias if they were authored by
conservative groups or had a favorable tone toward the military or previous dictatorship, which
would be discussed in September due to the anniversary of the coup. I identified articles as
having a liberal bias if they were critical of the military or the previous dictatorship or authored
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by liberal groups. Like in 1973, I looked for any words with strong connotations and analyzed
the context to examine if they were being used to promote one ideology over another.
Finally, for both 1973 and 2013, I deemed an article as objective if it presented fair coverage
of both sides within the article and did not use strongly negative words against one side over
another. Furthermore, for both years, I looked at the entire newspaper issues to see if the number
of editorials from one ideology were equal to the number from the other ideology and if selection
bias was present.
II. El Mercurio 1973
The September 1, 1973 issue of El Mercurio had approximately 27 of its 60 articles concern
one of two topics: support for the military or the shortcomings of Allende’s presidency. The
articles that did not concern one of these topics were often about soft news and culture, such as
sports or art, and not political in nature. Furthermore, all of the editorials and opinion pieces
were written about a social problem or were to speak out against Allende and Marxism, thus not
showing a diversity of ideology and presenting only one point of view. Additionally, people and
groups who had and have conservative tendencies, such as the “Informe del Colegeio de
Abogados,” (“Report of the Lawyers Union”) which is similar to the American BAR Association
for lawyers, dominated as the authors of the editorials. These editorials focused on topics like
“incapacidad presidencial” (“presidential inability”), which when analyzed in context, are critical
of Allende (El Mercurio, 1973). Using my pre-determined criteria for a conservative bias, it
appears that this issue leaned to the right in its selection of topics.
Not only did El Mercurio feature news that focused on the failures of Allende and the threat of
Marxism, it also has signs of presentation bias, as evidenced in the actual language of the articles
themselves. When looking at the content of the articles on the front page, each appears to
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sensationalize and escalate the problems in Chilean society to create fear and prompt social
action. For example, in “Azucar Al Cero” (“Sugar to the Zero”), there is a line that says,
“Gracias a la capacidad incomparable y destructiva de la Unidad Popular, los precios y la
inflación están aumentando…” (“thanks to the incomparable destructive capacity of the Popular
Unity, prices and inflation are increasing…”) and essentially states that the lack of food and bad
economy is due to the failures of Allende’s government (El Mercurio, 1973). Instead of simply
stating that there was a food crisis, which would be a less biased way of communicating, the
article explicitly linked societal problems to the Popular Unity and used language derogatory to
the political party and liberal ideology, which conforms to my criteria of having a conservative
bias.
Another example of presentation bias can be found in the article “Atropellos al Poder
Legislativo” (“Abuses of Legislative Power”), which states, “El Gobierno de Allende ha
capitaneado una infamante campaña de injurias y calumnias contra la Corte Suprema” (“The
government of Allende has captained an infamous campaign of injuries and slander against the
Supreme Court”), which basically accuses Allende’s government of falsely attacking and
injuring the Supreme Court, the national symbol of justice (El Mercurio, 1973). Once again,
instead of simply stating the news, the article uses diction to create a negative stigma toward the
Allende government and paints it as though the Chilean society and economy were in shambles
only because of Allende’s policies.
Another example of bias is in the language of the article “Ataque de Rusia Teme China
Roja” (“Russia Fears Attack of Red China”), which contains the terms “radical,” volátil” and
“extremistas” (“radical,” “volatile,” and “extremists”), when discussing China’s communist
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influence. Even the headline itself paints a negative view of the leftist ideology, with communist
China being the aggressor against a fearful Russia.
The front-page article “Renunció Almirante Montero” (“Resignation of Admiral Montero”)
featured the resignation of Allende’s Chief of the Navy in a positive light, discussing how he was
a traitor and weak (El Mercurio, 1973). Using my criteria, I determined that, although this article
is technically critical of the armed forces, it is more of a personal attack and an attack on Allende
than on the institution itself because it is favorable to the idea that a new admiral would take
over, which would make it more conservative than liberal (El Mercurio, 1973).
This specific issue also contained a lot of information about the Christian Democratic Party
and its response to the Allende government, which is interesting because, as previously noted,
the Christian Democratic Party was the centrist party, not Allende’s party. Research about
Chilean party politics indicates that in the 1970 election, the Christian Democratic Party
supported Allende and the Popular Unity and created a coalition that helped him get elected.
However, as the economy grew worse and problems arose, the Christian Democratic Party
withdrew support for Allende and began to support more conservative groups. This shift was
evidenced and exaggerated in El Mercurio articles, such as “PDC responde al Gobierno de
Allende” (“PDC responds to Allende government”), which discusses the party’s criticism of
Allende (El Mercurio, 1973). In this coverage, the newspaper made it seem as though there was
no support for Allende in the Chilean community, not even among moderate parties. While it is
true that the Christian Democratic Party withdrew its support, this issue of El Mercurio appears
to capitalize on and exaggerate it, which hints at both presentation and selection bias. This
framing also successfully aided the aforementioned environment of self-censorship in which
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people may be reluctant to share their views if they are different from those that are prominent in
the public discourse.
Another noteworthy and rather peculiar aspect about this issue of El Mercurio is its attack on
La Segunda, another newspaper owned by the conservative Edwards family. The article titled
“La Segunda Emplaza al Subsecretario del Interior” (“La Segunda Summons the Undersecretary
of Interior”) discusses that the Undersecretary met with La Segunda editors to shut down the
publication due to communist infiltration (El Mercurio, 1973). On one hand, this contradicts a
traditional media theory that states that the ideology of an outlet’s owners shapes and creates
bias. However, on the other hand, this same theory is confirmed by El Mercurio’s incessant
attack on Marxist and leftist ideas and, therefore, it is possible that El Mercurio’s attack on La
Segunda was a public relations tactic and aimed to demonstrate that even the most conservative
are not safe from the evils of communism (Dougnac & Lagos, 2009). In either case, the attack on
the La Segunda still exemplifies the widespread lack of pluralism and tolerance for any
suggestion of leftist ideas, no matter who proliferated them.
III. La Nación
La Nación, a state-owned and government-subsidized paper founded in 1917 by Eliodoro
Yáñez and taken over by dictator Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in 1927, essentially has served as the
mouthpiece for whatever political party has held power (Cole, 1996). With a smaller circulation
than El Mercurio, at about 45,000, the September 1, 1973 issue of La Nación served the interests
of the Popular Unity because it was the political party in power during the time. However, within
the next few months, this would change and La Nación would serve as the voice of the Pinochet
authorities, which may contribute to a shortcoming in my overall analysis.
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In terms of selection bias, this issue of La Nación mostly featured topics where it could
defend actions of the Allende government and not draw attention to failures of the economy.
While its articles covered topics similar to the articles in El Mercurio, such as discussions of the
failing economy or of other nations and their reactions to communism, it often took the opposite
position and defended the left while focusing on the weaknesses of the rightist arguments, which
according to my criteria would indicate a liberal bias. For example, one of the article headlines
was “En Descubierto Falsedades de la Prensa Derecha,” which translates to “In discovery of the
falsities of the rightist press…” and basically attacks El Mercurio and other newspapers for
exaggerating the failures of the economic situation (La Nación, 1973).
In fact, a majority of the articles in the issue tried to rebut attacks that were instigated by the
right or tried to demonstrate that the right was incorrect and, in doing so, undermined some of
the newspaper’s credibility. For example, one of the articles that attacked the right claimed that
El Mercurio prostitutes the profession of journalism, which is language that clearly carries a
connotation and indicates a bias against what I identified as conservative. However, La Nación
also does not have any substantial claims or arguments against the opposition and all of its
attacks on conservatism are mere puffery, which questions if any bias existing in La Nación was
significant.
While statements like the one above indicate that La Nación may have been liberally biased
in its language, due to its defensive position, it is unlikely that the power of its bias was
equivalent to that of El Mercurio. El Mercurio had the upper hand and, if it chose to, could
subliminally suggest and frame that problems in society were due to the leftist ideology. La
Nación, on the other hand, was under attack and could only defend itself by using bias to say that
the right was exaggerating. While El Mercurio had events with which to back up its claims, La
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Nación had nothing but the faulty economy and failed policies of the Allende administration.
This not only made its bias more exaggerated and lessened its credibility, but also meant that it
had no real power in communicating the liberal agenda, suggesting that El Mercurio had the
agenda-setting power and, therefore, the selection power.
While there are some exceptions in La Nación, such as “Quisieron Masacrar a 23 niños
cubanos” (“They Wanted to Massacre 23 Cuban Children”), which proactively attack the right in
ways like framing conservatives as child-killers, most of its articles are not biased in the way that
articles in El Mercurio are biased because, as mentioned earlier, they are simply fending off
attacks (La Nación, 1973). For example, the front-page headline “El Gobierno Chileno no es
Marxista” (“The Chilean Government is not Marxist”) has the structure of a retort to rightist
attacks and does not attack the right, but instead tries to reassure citizens that the Allende
administration is not Marxist (La Nación, 1973). This is noteworthy to my analysis because my
criteria for a liberal bias include supporting Allende and, while this article does not defame
Allende, it explains why the Chilean government is not Marxist, which is an ideology that
liberalism would support and, therefore, would not be liberal by my criteria.
I conclude that since the left had no positive events or information to promote its position, the
right was able to exploit the power of the media to aid in the demise of the Allende
administration by focusing on the negative. Using the “Fourth Estate” communications theory, it
can be inferred that, because the media is the watchdog of the government, if one group has
power over the media, it cannot also hold power over the government, which suggests that, even
though both newspaper outlets were biased, the right had an advantage in the Chilean press
before the coup.
IV. Significance in 1973
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While according to my criteria both El Mercurio and La Nación were biased in the selection or
presentation of content in the years leading up to the coup, due to the wider readership and
higher status of El Mercurio, the impact of the conservative bias in El Mercurio was likely more
significant than the impact of any liberal bias in La Nación during this time. Furthermore, El
Mercurio appears to have been in a more powerful position because it could create stronger
arguments and attack the left while defending its own ideology, thus contributing to the growing
discontent with the Allende presidency.
V. The Newspapers Today
As previously mentioned, El Mercurio still enjoys a widespread print circulation. On the other
hand, La Nación ceased its printed publication in December 2012 and now operates exclusively
online. While this is most likely due to the effects of new technologies and increased
globalization, the fact that the rightist newspaper is one of the few newspapers that can still
afford to print and widely distribute also suggests that the dictatorship had a serious impact on
pluralism in the press and, subsequently, Chilean society and public opinion. However, at the
same time, it appears that other South American countries of similar populations and
dictatorships, such as Ecuador, have far less press freedom and far fewer in-print publications,
which suggests that maybe the Pinochet dictatorship did not have a noteworthy impact on the
Chilean media in comparison to other nations. To discover whether El Mercurio still has a rightleaning frame today, I use the aforementioned criteria for conservatism, liberalism and
objectivity to analyze its issue for September 1, 2013, 40 years after the coup, and juxtapose it to
an online edition of La Nación for the same day. Additionally, in order to reliably grasp the
context of my findings, I compare and contrast both issues of the current newspapers to their
1973 editions.
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VI. El Mercurio Today
In comparison to the September 1, 1973 issue of El Mercurio, the modern issue appears to
have far less conservatism and bias according to my criteria. The articles throughout the issue
cover a diverse array of topics, ranging from the economy to politics to foreign affairs, presented
more objectively than the 1973 issue. While the 1973 issue had front-page articles that only
promoted the right, such as “Azucar al Cero” (“Sugar to the Zero”) that painted Allende as the
sole cause for the failing economy, the 2013 issue has front-page articles like “Nueve de 11
sectores económicos en Chile han perdido productividad desde 2009” (“Nine of 11 economic
sectors in Chile have lost productivity since 2009”), which discusses economic difficulties, but
does not blame any particular ideology or political party for the problems, which conforms to my
definition of objectivity in this study (El Mercurio, 2013). This wider range and, by my criteria,
more objective presentation suggests that, unlike in 1973, the newspaper no longer just focuses
on promoting the interests of the right and demonstrating the failures of the left, but tries to
present a more accurate depiction of Chilean society.
That being said, when looking at certain articles, the impact of the previously obvious
conservative bias is still somewhat evident today. For example, an article titled “PS y
conmemoración del Golpe hará el Gobierno: ‘Estará llena de cómplices” (“The Socialist Party
and Commemoration of the Coup will make the Government: ‘It will be full of accomplices’”),
discusses the military coup of 1973, which, in a sense, is more objective in that it at least
acknowledges the realities of the dictatorship and does not completely exclude any discussion
(El Mercurio, 2013). However, the content and word choice within this article appear to have a
presentation bias, such as when a prominent member of the left is described as a “socialist
helmsmen,” which, by my pre-determined criteria, indicates a slight conservative bias because of
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the connotations that accompany the language. While the article itself is actually about keeping
peace on the forty-year anniversary of the coup, the headline uses the word “accomplices” in a
sensationalistic way that paints socialists negatively. Therefore, while the diction is not as radical
as terms used in 1973, such as “volatile,” it still carries a slight negative connotation and
indicates a bias against leftist politicians (El Mercurio, 2013).
Furthermore, while there is more balance in the selection of editorial views, the 2013 issue
still appears to contain a slight bias for rightist over leftist submissions, such as seen in “Una
mirada desde la perspectiva histórica” (“A look from the historical perspective”), a segment that
debates the events of the coup as exaggerated memories versus actual historical facts and
contains a significant amount of conservative contributors (El Mercurio, 2013). As editorials,
these segments are expected to have bias, but are still important to consider because if an
audience is only receiving the opinions of one side through the editorials, it is difficult for it to
make its own informed decisions simply due to lack of information about the other side.
Even so, there is still a wider range of topics within this modern issue than in the 1973 issue,
such as more articles about foreign affairs and culture, and none of the content outwardly attacks
or condemns the left. This may indicate that, while El Mercurio still leans to the right, the threat
of the dictatorship is not at the level it was before or during the military coup and may not have a
serious and lasting effect on Chilean society and public opinion. However, it could also just be
that in 1973, there was a crisis that was not paralleled in 2013 and the conservative media needed
to be more vocal against the left in order to solicit change favorable to its ideology. Or, while
today’s El Mercurio may just simply be less biased, it could also be that the censorship during
the dictatorship and today’s lack of media pluralism created a context in which El Mercurio has
not needed to actively combat the leftist ideology. Additionally, the rise of 24-hour news and
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ability to post content online may have had implications for the content in the print edition,
which can only be determined through a more thorough and extended analysis. In any case, the
reason why the shift in El Mercurio framing and coverage occurred is still unclear.
Another interesting observation about the modern issue of El Mercurio is its obsession with
American politics and foreign policy. While it covers events going on in other nations, such as
Argentina, the majority of the articles concerning foreign affairs are centered on the United
States, such as one headline that discusses Obama’s plans for action in Syria. The stress on this
topic could simply be due to the hegemonic role of the United States in the globe, but it could
also be linked to remnants of the newspaper’s previous ties to the United States government and
the financial support it received in the years leading up to the coup (Kornbluh, 2003).
VII. La Nación Today
When compared to the 1973 issue, the modern La Nación appears to have changed
dramatically. Not only is it now strictly online, the leftist Popular Unity is no longer the political
party in power and, therefore, the content is unlike the content in 1973. Instead of featuring
stories that defend the government and attack the right, La Nación contains a plethora of topics
within its headlines, from the presidential race to events in Argentina, which is a trend that is
also evidenced in today’s El Mercurio.
However, unlike the September 1, 2013 issue of El Mercurio, the September 1, 2013 issue of
La Nación does not address any of the upcoming events commemorating the anniversary of the
September 11, 1973 coup. While on one hand this means that there cannot be presentation bias in
discussing the events, the avoidance of this topic could also imply a sense of denial and hint at
selection bias (McCombs, 2004). Even the editorials, which represent both leftist and rightist
opinions, do not have any content discussing the dictatorship, its effects or the upcoming
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anniversary. This could affect Chilean society because, in a sense, it continues the selfcensorship from the dictatorship. However, at the same time, I only chose one day to analyze
news coverage and a limit of this research is that it is possible that in the days to come La Nación
included much information about the coup and its anniversary.
Few of the articles had content that coincided with my criteria for a left or right bias, which
differs from the 1973 issue of La Nación and from both issues of El Mercurio. For example, one
article discusses three of the presidential candidates and their campaigns and, in doing so, does
not favor any one candidate over another, which falls most closely to my definition of
objectivity. Like many of the articles, each candidate was quoted and there was no language or
code words that suggested that one was less capable or desirable, indicating that the leftist bias of
La Nación before the dictatorship is now not of serious consequence. However, it is also
important to note that in the years between my two analyses, La Nación, as the statist paper,
switched from supporting Allende to being a conservative outlet for the Pinochet government,
which may explain why the paper does not appear to have a strong bias in either direction today
(Secretaria de Comunicación y Cultura, 1994).
Additionally, like El Mercurio, most of the articles in La Nación about foreign policy concern
the United States, which highlights the influence of the United States in Chile and suggests that
my previous speculation about the special relationship that El Mercurio shared with the Nixon
administration may not be a significant factor as to why news coverage focuses on the United
States today.
VIII. Conclusion
In qualitatively examining both past and present issues of El Mercurio, the most prominent
and widely circulated newspaper in Chilean society today, my research indicates that, according
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to my criteria, the newspaper had an evident conservative bias in both the selection and framing
of its articles leading up to the coup. I also observed that remnants of this bias exist in the paper
on a smaller scale today and, due to the prominence of El Mercurio, may have an effect on how
Chileans view their society. In fact, this conclusion is even supported by other research, such as a
2010 study that identified that 60% of El Mercurio readers identify with the right (Ilabaca,
Lucero & Pineda, 2010). However, this could also be due to a number of other reasons that
influence people to read El Mercurio in the first place, such as education or income.
Using my criteria for bias, I also determined that La Nación had a liberal bias during the
years leading up to the coup, but is fairly objective today. While this could be due to its switch
from a liberal to a conservative paper to a centrist paper, it could also imply that maybe the
dictatorship’s impact on El Mercurio was significant.
While my juxtaposition of El Mercurio to La Nación evidences the effects of the
dictatorship on media and indicates that, in comparison to La Nación, El Mercurio and its
conservative bias might have a more influential impact on public opinion today, it is also
important to consider that there is no crisis occurring in Chile today that is equal to the events in
1973. Furthermore, the new technologies and ways of receiving information could also have a
significant impact on how these outlets are presenting information. Therefore, it is impossible to
tell if El Mercurio is more balanced in its coverage or if in a crisis it would revert to its tactics
from the time of the coup. However, in analyzing El Mercurio coverage from more recent
instances of civil unrest, such as the 2011 student protests, studies have shown that the
newspaper consistently uses a conservative frame and tends to reaffirm its conservative ideology
(Cabalin, 2014). On the other hand, these student protests are still not equal to the civil unrest of
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the coup and, therefore, there is no way of completely knowing if El Mercurio exhibits the same
level of bias today as it did in the 1970s.

Chapter 4: Media in the Southern Cone
Having seen in the previous chapter that during the dictatorship El Mercurio had, to some
extent, a conservative bias that is still slightly present today, my goal in this chapter is to contrast
these findings with information about the press in Argentina, another nation that experienced a
dictatorship similar to Pinochet. In doing so, I aim to discover if the effects of the dictatorship on
the Chilean press are different compared to other nations. However, this analysis can only
provide historical and factual comparisons, as I will not compare framing and possible bias
between newspapers in the two nations because applying my criteria for bias across countries
would be challenging due to differences in culture and events. However, in this analysis, I strive
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to determine if it is likely that the current lack of media pluralism in Chilean media also exists in
other Latin American countries and, subsequently, analyze possible reasons as to why Chile may
be similar or different to other nations that experienced dictatorships.
I. Argentina’s Dictatorship
Like Chile, Argentina also experienced a long history of military involvement in government
and had a military dictatorship in the 20th century that was a response to the increase of leftist
ideas in society. Due to fear of communism and domestic disputes, an alliance of military
officials overthrew the government in 1943 (Noel, 2013). In 1945, Juan Perón became President
and implemented a populist government, which rejected extreme capitalism and communism and
promoted the state as the mediator in conflicts between workers and businesses (Noel, 2013). As
the number of unionized worker and government programs increased, the United States felt
threatened by possible communism in the Western hemisphere, so it became increasingly
involved in supporting the “antiperonist parties.” Furthermore, due to Perón’s increased social
programs, there was an increase in government spending, which, in conjunction with his
isolationist foreign policy that limited economic and intellectual trade with other nations, caused
inflation to skyrocket and the economy to suffer (Noel, 2013).
When newspapers and other opposition began to speak out against his regime, Perón, like
Pinochet, resorted to violence and censorship. While the Constitution of 1853 clearly gave rights
to the press, even mentioning that there was to be no censorship, Perón nationalized the
broadcasting system and monopolized the newspaper industry, which shut down many
opposition papers and left in circulation only La Nación, Clarín and La Prensa, the last of which
he also eventually shut down (Samples, 2008). Like Pinochet in Chile, he was the first Argentine
ruler to fully recognize the power of the media and use it for propaganda, advertising and even
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intimidation. For example, La Democracia, the unofficial newspaper of Peronism, contained
many similarities to Chile’s dictatorship-influenced El Mercurio in that every aspect of the
paper, from the tabloids to the editorials, was infused with support for the regime (Samples,
2008).
Existing research suggests that the effects of Argentine media control were similar to those
in Chile, meaning that there was increased self-censorship, a widespread fear of speaking out
against the government and a lack of diverse ideas spreading within society (Samples, 2008).
With the government using the media as a mouthpiece for its policies, it was difficult for
Argentine citizens to organize against the oppressive regime, let alone receive any truthful and
unbiased information.
Even though Perón was overthrown and exiled in 1955, the Argentine military dictatorships
did not cease and neither did the press censorship. Throughout the rest of the 1950s and into the
1970s, the Argentine government was extremely unstable, with frequent military coups, and it
wavered between different ideologies, even returning to Peronism for a time (Noel, 2013). In the
early 1970s, Argentina, like many other countries in South America, experienced a strong
increase in the number of Marxist and leftist groups who outspokenly and sometimes violently
advocated for a more leftist government. Peronism was seen as unable to resist the threat of these
groups and, as a result, there was a coup by the armed forces in 1976 to overthrow Perón’s wife
Isabel, and institute a government ruled by the junta (Noel, 2013). From 1976 to 1983, the most
prominent member of the junta, Jorge Rafael Videla, ruled the nation and perpetuated what is
known today as the “Dirty War,” in which thousands of members of the opposition were killed
and media outlets were censored and closed (Samples, 2008).
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During this time, the junta primarily focused on censorship of the printed press and not other
outlets because of its widespread credibility and its ability to reach all social classes, which was
not true for television and radio at the time (Samples, 2008). Therefore, while there may have
been a slight return of pluralism in the time between Perón and Videla, any pluralism that did
reemerge vanished with the newspapers’ passive acceptance of the censorship. Only two
newspapers occasionally spoke out against the regime, the Buenos Aires Herald and La Opinión,
and, even so, they often only did so subtly (Samples, 2008). The effects of media censorship and
control by Argentine dictators paralleled those in Chile during Pinochet, such as self-censorship
and a decrease in pluralism, thus indicating that the Argentine media may be similar to Chilean
media today due to impact of the dictatorship.
II. Argentina’s Media Today
As a result of the continued censorship, the Argentine media was significantly polarized and
has been dominated primarily by one group, the Group Clarín, which owns the Clarín
newspaper, the most widely circulated newspaper in Latin America, and Papel Prensa, which is
the nation’s largest newsprint manufacturer (Cole, 1996).
Due to similarities between Chile’s and Argentina’s historical and economical framework
and their dictatorships’ impacts on the media, I speculate that Argentina’s present media
domination by one corporation could suggest that its dictatorship had a significant effect on
newspaper circulation and, subsequently, Argentine public opinion. However, when simply
examining the data qualitatively, this does not appear to be the case. The number of newspapers
circulating in Argentina, which is at least 90, is higher than the number of newspapers circulating
in Chile, which is approximately 60, and there is a more diverse representation of both leftist and
rightist ideas exhibited in Argentine newspapers. For example, while many of the newspapers
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that spoke out against the Pinochet regime, such as El Siglo, do not have significant circulation
today, Argentina’s Buenos Aires Herald, which highlighted some of the horrors of the “Dirty
War,” is flourishing today (Samples, 2008). While the Argentine population is double the
Chilean population, which may be one possible explanation as to why there are more newspapers
circulating, Chilean newspaper circulation still experienced a larger percent decrease than that of
Argentina. From 2000 to 2004, the circulation per 1,000 inhabitants in Chile went from 90
newspapers to 50.6 whereas in Argentina it went from 45.8 to 35.92, which is a much smaller
decline (Millet, Holmes & Perez, 2010).
There could be many reasons to explain why the Argentine media appears to be
experiencing more pluralism than the Chilean media. The first could be that the Argentine
dictatorship, ending in 1983, ended before the Chilean dictatorship and, thus, Argentine society
has had more time to reclaim its civil liberties and freedoms. The second could be that there are
differences in activism levels between the citizens of the two nations. For example, the Argentine
government passed a law known as “Ley de Medios” (“Law of Media”) in 2009 that essentially
limits the number of media outlets a single company can own and, on face value, promotes more
pluralism (Warren, 2014). Previous to the implementation of this law, the Clarín Group held a
monopoly of the television and radio licenses and, thus, controlled what was considered “news.”
Therefore, in 2008, when President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner decided to raise taxes on
exports and the Clarín Group used its media power to support the opposition, she initiated the
“Ley de Medios” to try to diversify coverage and also give her administration more power over
the media (Smink, 2013). The Clarín Group was not pleased with this law and recently, as of
November 2013, took it to the Supreme Court, which upheld its constitutionality and approved
the division and distribution of the company in order to promote more media pluralism (Warren,
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2014). While the court claimed the law was constitutional because it promotes media pluralism,
it appears that the intentions of Fernandez de Kirchner were actually to assert more control over
the media, which may have interesting implications for the future and indicates that the
Argentine government still has much control over the information disseminated in society and
that, maybe, its pluralism and press freedom is a façade.
However, Argentina is not alone in passing legislation that inadvertently promotes more
freedom for the press. In 2007, Uruguay, the other Southern Cone nation that had a dictatorship
paralleling those in Chile and Argentina, passed an anti-monopoly law ensuring more media
pluralism (Uruguay, 2013). Like Argentina, Uruguay’s dictatorship ended in 1983, which is
earlier than Chile’s dictatorship and may explain why the Chilean Congress has not introduced
any legislation that seeks to divide the Copesa and Edwards media duopoly. While it is possible
that passing similar legislation could make Chilean media more pluralistic and lessen any lasting
effects of the dictatorship, it is unlikely that any will be passed in the near future because of the
elite consensus. In fact, this legislation may only come as result of a situation similar to that of
Argentina, when a person of power does not like the way they are portrayed by one of the media
conglomerates and, thus, advocates for legal action.
Chapter 5: Media and its Effects on Public Opinion
Thus far, I have argued that the Chilean military dictatorship had a severe impact on Chilean
media. Through both a qualitative comparison between Chilean newspapers and a comparative
analysis with another nation, I have shown that press framing, censorship and self-censorship
before and during the dictatorship have had a severe impact on the ownership of media in Chile
today, and, thus, the pluralism and proliferation of ideas in Chilean society. The goal of this
chapter is to quantitatively analyze if the results of the effects of the dictatorship on the media
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have any real and lasting effects on Chilean public opinion. In other words, through cross
tabulations, I aim to discover if there are any actual lasting and significant impacts of the
dictatorship’s relationship with the media on Chilean society.
I. Literature Review Concerning the Media
Traditionally, media has been defined as the most powerful means of collective mass
communication and, throughout history, each scholar has applied this definition differently to
explain the role that the media plays in society (Dwivedi & Pandey, 2013). Some have said that
the role of the media is to be a watchdog of the government. Others claim that the purpose of the
media is to inform and engage people in society (McCombs, 2004). Still others state that the
media’s true role is dependent on how society chooses to use it, in other words suggesting that
the effects of the media actually differ depending on who consumes the content (Scherman &
Arriagada, 2012). For example, one such theory is the hypodermic needle theory, which was
named because it suggests that media content producers create messages that have a direct,
immediate and powerful impact on passive content consumers by “injecting” them with
appropriate messages to elicit a desired response. Hand-in-hand with this theory is the agendasetting theory, which claims that the media presents and frames issues in a manner that gives it
significant power to influence topics in the public agenda (Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011). On
the contrary, there are other theories, such as the reception theory, that argue that, depending on
an audience’s previously held beliefs and experiences, it will view and react to media content
differently (Ilabaca, Lucero, & Pineda 1999). This theory relates closely to the cultivation theory,
which argues that when consumers see things in the media, they adopt them as part of their own
ideology and lifestyles (Ilabaca, Lucero & Pineda, 1999).
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When discussing the application of media theories in the case of Chile during the Pinochet
dictatorship, scholars have argued that, due to the aforementioned censorship and propaganda of
the time, the agenda-setting theory is the most relevant theory (Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011).
In fact, research has indicated that the effects of censorship and media control were so significant
that they not only impacted the proliferation of ideas in society, but the political agenda and
socio-economic environment as well (Robinson, 2001). While scholars vary in their opinions
concerning the extent of this impact, most agree that due to the media’s role as the primary
deliverer of information, the dictatorship’s influence on the media has been a significant factor in
influencing public opinion (McCombs, 2004). In other words, the media has so much power in
determining the topics in the public discourse and the way people view society, that any
indication of bias within the media, often initiated by the elites that dominate the industry, may
have significant impacts on public policy. A study by Robinson argues that when the government
controls the media, elite policy preferences are simply maintained in order to keep the wealthy in
power, which subsequently perpetuates the growth of social problems instead of solving real
issues (Robinson, 2001).
More specifically, research unveils that, in the case of an authoritarian regime, the
government retains the ability to control versions of reality so that a higher dependency on
mainstream media manifests a more right-based ideology (Halpern & Ball-Rokeach, 1993). A
specific example of this relationship is evidenced in the case of Chile and the Pinochet regime’s
relationship with El Mercurio. During the time of the dictatorship, the press, along with radio,
was the top source of information for citizens and was also deemed the most reliable (Garretón,
1999). However, in reality, due to censorship, self-censorship and propaganda efforts, the press
was not as reliable or objective as people believed, which, during the dictatorship, had a
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significant impact on public opinion. By only permitting the distribution of ideas that supported
the dictatorship, the regime created a false climate of support for Pinochet within the media that
allowed the dictatorship to retain power for a longer period of time and resulted in a rightist
political tendency that may not have existed if the press had been free (Ilabaca, Lucero & Pineda,
2010). For example, in the plebiscite of 1988, only a little over half of Chileans voted against
Pinochet after 17 years of the dictatorship and its human rights violations, even though many
were not happy with his government (Paredes, 2013). While there are many reasons why this is
true, one of them is that many Chileans just did not know the realities of the dictatorship and,
when they did, were afraid to speak out, both of which can be at least partially attributed to being
denied access to unbiased information (Secretaria de Comunicación y Cultura, 1994).
Even immediately following the dictatorship, the Chilean public did not vote for an
overwhelmingly leftist candidate, but chose Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democratic Party,
the centrist party that eventually aided the media effort against Allende in the 1973 coup (Scully,
1992). Even though censorship laws were lifted when the dictatorship was over, research shows
that the effects of the dictatorship on the press have lasted and created conglomerates that have
perpetuated a lack of pluralism that exists today (Insunza, 1999). While in this paper I have
suggested that censorship and control of the media during the dictatorship had substantial
impacts on media bias and, subsequently, Chilean public opinion at the time, there has been little
to no empirical research examining if any bias has had a lasting effect on Chilean public opinion
and ideology, thus providing an opportunity for quantitative research.
II. Hypothesis
In light of the impact of the dictatorship’s creation of bias within the press, a key source of
information during the time of the dictatorship, I propose that, due to the Pinochet dictatorship’s
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control of newspapers during the 1970s and 1980s, Chilean newspapers today still display a
rightist bias that is contributing to a widespread conservative Chilean public opinion.
III. Research Design
To test my hypothesis, I obtained all of my data from the 2010 public opinion survey from
Latinobarómetro database, an online database containing annual public opinion survey data for
Latin American nations. Then, I compared the results for the units of analysis, which were
survey respondents, using cross-tabulations and linear regressions created in SPSS software.
I used responses from multiple survey questions as variables in order to improve the validity
of the analysis. For the first set of cross tabulations, the independent variable is whether or not
the respondents inform themselves about politics using the newspaper or another media outlet
and the dependent variable is the respondent’s identification on the left-right scale. I recoded the
latter so that 0 to 4 constitutes as left, 5 as centrist and 6 to 10 as rightist in order to collapse the
data and make it easier to read.
For the second set of cross tabulations, the independent variable is the number of days per
week a respondent reads the newspaper and the dependent variable is the respondent’s opinion
about the previous military dictatorship, which I recoded as favorable, neutral and not favorable.
The values of the independent variables and dependent variables remained the same for each
country I used in the analysis and comparison.
To measure the relationships between these variables as accurately as possible, I obtained
information from Latinobarómetro to control for other factors, such as income, education and
age, because each could have a statistically significant effect on the results of the study. For
example, I could discover that those with higher levels of education are more likely to read the
newspaper and, thus, the ideological effects could be different and, maybe, in reality, education
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influences rightist ideology more than newspaper readership. Another possible outcome could be
that the way newspapers frame certain issues resonates differently between older members of the
population, who may have lived through the dictatorship, and younger members of the
population, who may more readily turn to social media to receive their information. Whatever
the case, I recoded each of these variables and placed them into larger groups in order to more
visibly account for which factors are statistically significant in the formation of ideology. My
goal in controlling for these variables is to increase the validity and reliability of the analysis and
hopefully isolate for the effect that the press may have on Chilean public opinion.
However, even though controlling for some of the external factors can increase the validity of
the study, there are some aspects of public opinion surveys that are inherently unreliable and
inaccurate. For example, some of the questions in the survey may have been phrased in a
confusing or biased way, thus eliciting inaccurate responses from participants. Another way in
which this study could be inaccurate or unreliable is that it does not consider which newspaper
the respondent is reading. In other words, of those who read the newspaper, it is possible that this
particular sample only read leftist newspapers, which would decrease the validity and accuracy
of my analysis.
Additionally, as with a majority of media studies, it is hard to isolate the media from other
factors that play a role in the creation of ideology and this could call into doubt the extent of the
media’s effect. For example, it could be possible that Chileans in general are just more
conservative than citizens of other nations, independent of the effects of the press. Lastly, since I
only used data from one year and did not compare it to previous responses, such as those from
1970, I cannot effectively track changes over time and it is hard to determine whether or not a
conservative bias always existed within Chilean public opinion or if it is a result of the changes

49

in the media. However, due to the large impact of the dictatorship on the press in the 1970s and
existing evidence of this impact today through the media dupoly, I believe that an argument can
be made that the events of 40 years ago still affect Chilean public opinion.
The Latinobarómetro survey itself appears to have good internal reliability because it has
multiple questions that ask the same thing in different ways and all receive consistent responses.
I used the varying questions to my advantage in this paper by using different variables that all
measure the same concept in my various cross tabulations in order to discover if the results were
all similar and, therefore, provide more validity for the conclusions.
I expect that the data will show that an increase in newspaper use or a preference to read the
newspaper over other media outlets will result in a higher identification with conservative
ideology. In order to place the significance of these findings in a larger context, I compare the
results of the Chilean cross tabulations of the 2010 Latinobarómetro public opinion survey data
to the results in Argentina and for Latin American as a whole. I hypothesize that the effects of
the press on ideology are similar in both Chile and Argentina and thus indicate that authoritarian
control of the press has a noteworthy impact on public opinion and creation of policy even after
years of democracy.
IV. Assessment and Analysis:
Table 1: Latin American Ideology And Information about Politics from
Newspapers

Political Information from Newspapers

Not mentioned

Mentioned

Total

Left
Count

3106

2120

5226

50

30.60%

31.30%

30.80%

Count

3315

2274

5589

Percentage

32.60%

33.50%

33.00%

Count

3742

2390

6132

Percentage

36.80%

35.20%

36.20%

Count

10163

6784

16947

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Percentage
Center

Ideology

Right

Total

Pearson Chi-Square 4.47, p=0.107
Table 1 is a cross tabulation between the number of Latin Americans who inform themselves
about politics using newspapers and their subsequent identification on the left-right scale. It
indicates that when not controlling for any other possible variables, people who chose to inform
themselves about politics using newspapers are not significantly impacted in their identification
on the left-right scale. While 35.2% of those who mentioned newspapers as a source of
information about politics identified with the right, 36.8% who did not mention newspapers as a
source also identified with the right, thus showing that there is not a substantive ideological
difference between those who read newspapers and those who do not in Latin America as a
whole.
Table 2: Chilean Ideology And Information about Politics from
Newspapers

Political Information from Newspapers

Not mentioned

Mentioned

Total

Left

51

Count

193

103

296

Percentage

36.90%

31.70%

34.90%

Count

182

100

282

Percentage

34.80%

30.80%

33.30%

Count

148

122

270

Percentage

28.30%

37.50%

31.80%

Count

523

325

848

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Center

Ideology

Right

Total

Pearson Chi-Square 7.913, p= 0.019
The results from Table 1 can be contrasted to Table 2, which is a cross tabulation strictly
between the number of Chileans who inform themselves about politics using newspapers and
their identification on the left-right scale. When not controlling for any variables, 37.5% of those
who identify with the right in Chile mentioned reading newspapers as a source of political
information whereas 28.3% who identify with the right in Chile did not mention newspapers.
Furthermore, whereas only 36.9% of those who do not read newspapers in Chile identify with
the left, 31.7% of those who identify with the left read Chilean newspapers. This data, along with
the chi-square value of .019, indicates a statistically significant conclusion that Chileans who
read newspapers are more likely to have a conservative leaning than those who do not and
supports my hypothesis that there is a correlation between Chilean newspapers and a more
conservative public opinion. Furthermore, when compared to the results from Table 1, it appears
that newspaper readership in Chile is significant related to ideology among the countries in Latin
America.
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Table 3: Chilean Ideology And Information about
Politics from Radio

Political Information from
Radio

Not mentioned

Mentioned

Total

Left
Count

186

110

296

Percentage

35.90%

33.30%

34.90%

Count

182

100

282

Percentage

35.10%

30.30%

33.30%

Count

150

120

270

Percentage

29.00%

36.40%

31.80%

Count

518

330

848

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Center

Ideology

Right

Total

Pearson Chi-Square: 5.271, p=0.072
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Table 4: Chilean Ideology And Information about Politics
from Internet

Political Information from
Internet

Not mentioned

Mentioned

Total

Left
Count

225

71

296

Percentage

35.50%

33.00%

34.90%

Count

221

61

282

Percentage

34.90%

28.40%

33.30%

Count

187

83

270

Percentage

29.50%

38.60%

31.80%

Count

633

215

848

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Center

Ideology

Right

Total

Pearson Chi-Square: 6.497, p=0.039
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Table 5: Chilean Ideology And Information about Politics from TV

Political Information from Television

Not mentioned

Mentioned

Total

Left
Count

56

240

296

Percentage

37.60%

34.30%

34.90%

Count

57

225

282

Percentage

38.30%

32.20%

33.30%

Count

36

234

270

Percentage

24.20%

33.50%

31.80%

Count

149

699

848

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Center

Ideology

Right

Total

Pearson Chi-Square: 5.078, p=0.079
Table 6: Frequency - Those Who Inform Themselves About Politics
Using Media
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Newspaper
Not mentioned

Mentioned

Television

Radio

Internet

14363

4771

11951

18945

63.30%

21%

52.70%

83.50%

8324

17919

10736

3742

36.70%

79.00%

47.30%

16.50%

In order to more fully understand the significance of the effects of Chilean newspaper usage,
I compared the results to other media platforms as shown in the cross tabulations of Tables 3, 4
and 5. It appears that newspapers are not the only media platforms that result in increased
identification with rightist ideology and that, in fact, no matter what source Chileans receive their
news from, they tend to identify more strongly with the right. For example, when looking at
Table 3, which is a cross tabulation between radio usage and ideology, 36.4% mentioned
listening to the radio and identified with rightist ideology while 29.0% of those who identify with
the right did not mention listening to the radio. With there being similar results for those who
obtain information about politics from both television and the Internet, it appears that the more
that Chileans choose to inform themselves about politics through the media in general, the more
conservative they tend to be. Therefore, the results indicate that my hypothesis that reading
newspapers is related to a rightist bias in Chilean public opinion may have some level of
accuracy, but cannot be exclusively supported because it appears that every media outlet in Chile
creates rightist leanings in public opinion, not only newspapers. This is further supported by the
data in Table 6, which compares the frequencies that people mention any form of media as a
source of information, and indicates that maybe Chilean society is conservative due to other
reasons, not media framing and bias.
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Table 7: Argentine Ideology And Politics from Newspapers

Political Information from Newspapers

Not mentioned

Mentioned

Total

Left
Count

74

125

199

Percentage

19.70%

22.90%

21.60%

Count

185

244

409

Percentage

44.00%

44.60%

44.40%

Count

136

178

314

Percentage

36.30%

32.50%

34.10%

Count

375

547

922

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Center

Ideology

Right

Total

Pearson Chi-Square: 1.928, p=0.381
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Table 8: Argentina Ideology And Information about Politics from Radio

Political Information from
Radio

Not mentioned

Mentioned

Total

Left
Count

62

137

199

Percentage

43.10%

45.00%

44.40%

Count

127

282

409

Percentage

43.10%

33.20%

34.10%

Count

106

208

314

Percentage

35.90%

33.20%

34.10%

Count

295

627

922

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Center

Ideology

Right

Total

Pearson Chi-Square: 0.68, p=0.712
To further place this information in the context of Latin American media usage, I compared
the cross tabulations of Chilean media’s influence on ideology to Argentina. In doing so, I found
that while those who inform themselves using any media outlet in Chile identify with the rightist
ideology in a statistically significant way, those who inform themselves about politics through
media outlets in Argentina do not. As seen in Table 7, there is not a substantive difference in the
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ideology of Argentine people who mentioned informing themselves about politics through
newspapers and those who do not. In fact, when looking at the influence of other media outlets in
Argentina, such as radio in Table 8, it appears that the Argentine media sways public opinion
more to the left than to the right. While this does not directly support my hypothesis that strictly
reading newspapers in Chile results in a more widespread conservative public opinion, it does
suggest that maybe the Chilean media and not other factors are the reason that Chileans have a
conservative public opinion that is not evidenced in similar countries such as Argentina. While
there are many reasons this could be true, such as the aforementioned communications laws in
Argentina that promote more media pluralism, the data still demonstrate that the relationship
between media consumption and conservatism is stronger in Chile than it is in other similar
South American countries.
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Table 9: Opinion of Dictatorship And Frequency of Reading a
Newspaper

Frequency

None to
2 days

3 to 4 days

5 to 7
days

Total

Do Not
Support
Count

84

39

54

177

Percentage

34.30%

35.80%

35.30%

34.90%

Count

82

26

39

147

Percentage

33.50%

23.90%

25.50%

29.00%

Count

79

44

60

183

Percentage

32.20%

40.40%

39.20%

36.10%

Count

245

109

153

507

Percentage

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

100%

Neutral

Opinion of
Dictatorship

Support

Total

Pearson Chi-Square: 5.361, p=0.252
Table 9 shows that while 34.3% of those who disliked the previous military dictatorship claim
to only read newspapers for up to two days a week, 32.2% of those who were favorable to the
dictatorship make the same claim. When comparing percentages for those who read newspapers
seven days a week, 35.3% were not favorable to the military dictatorship and 39.2% were
favorable to the dictatorship. This indicates that those who read the newspaper more frequently
tend to have a less favorable view of the previous military dictatorship, regardless of their
identification of the left-right scale, which does not explicitly support my hypothesis. However,
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the data are all very similar, which suggests that the frequency that one reads the newspaper may
not be as important as actually choosing to learn about politics through the media.
Table 10: Multiple Linear Regression Analysis: Chilean Ideology and Newspapers

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B

Standard
Error

Constant

0.597

0.1

Information
About
Politics
from
Newspapers

0.082

0.058

Income

0.296

Education
Age

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Significance

Beta
5.958

0

0.052

1.413

0.158

0.057

0.193

5.2

0

0.074

0.037

0.08

2.017

0.044

0.156

0.039

0.158

4.039

0

R Square: 0.259, Adjusted R Square: 0.067
Thus far, the data have largely supported my hypothesis that newspapers are related to a
conservative ideology within Chilean public opinion that may be due to a bias that exists within
the media. However, this conclusion can be drawn only without controlling for any other
possible causes. Education is a possible cause because it could be that those with higher levels of
education are more likely to read the newspaper and, thus, the ideological effects could be
different and, maybe, in reality, education influences ideology more than newspaper readership.
Age is another possible influencer because the way newspapers frame certain issues resonates
differently between older members of the population, who may have lived through the
dictatorship, and younger members of the population, who may more readily turn to social media
to receive their information. Income is also a possible reason that those who read the newspaper
are more conservative because maybe wealthier people, who tend to be of more conservative
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societal classes, can simply afford to while other income levels cannot. While there may be other
reasons that may contribute to Chileans’ level of conservatism, after running a few cross
tabulations of possible reasons, I deemed these as the most logical and significant of my
influencers, which is why they are presented in my paper.
Table 10 shows a multiple linear regression analysis exemplifying the relationship between
those who chose to inform themselves about politics through newspapers and their ideology,
while controlling for education, age and income. In doing so, it appears that newspapers no
longer play a significant role in the reason that Chileans identify with the right.
The partial effect of the number of people who chose to read newspapers as a source of
political information, the independent variable, shows that with each additional person who
decided to read about politics using the newspapers, there was an increase in .082 in the
likelihood that they would identify as more conservative. This supports the claim made in the
hypothesis that reading newspapers contributes to Chilean conservatism. However, when
analyzing the t-statistic of 1.413, I determined that the effect that using newspapers as a source of
political information has on ideological identification is not statistically significant in
comparison to other variables. In fact, the research shows that all the other variables that were
controlled for, which were age, income and the level of education, play a positive and
statistically significant role in the formation of ideology because all of those t-statistics were
greater than two. This suggests that, while reading newspapers may be related to people’s
identification with the right, there are other factors that are more significant that could be the true
reason that Chilean public opinion leans conservatively. Therefore, my hypothesis that the
conservative framing of newspapers causes Chilean public opinion to be more conservative
cannot be fully accepted. However, it draws attention to other factors that may have a more
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statistically significant effect on ideology and calls for more research concerning the relationship
between these factors and newspaper readership.
Additionally, the R-squared value of .067 or 6.7% is very small, indicating that the variations
in ideology were not fully explained by the independent or control variables. This indicates that,
although this paper accounted for some of the reasons Chilean public opinion may be more
conservative, there are a wide variety of factors that may explain why and more research needs
to be done to identify these factors before connecting ideological identification in Chile solely to
the influence of the press or media. While I controlled for other variables throughout the research
and analysis, such as the effect of sex on ideology, I found many to be statistically insignificant
and, therefore, I omitted them from this paper in order to present the information with more
clarity and efficiency.
V. Conclusion
In my analysis, I demonstrated that while there is a relationship between Chilean newspaper
readership and conservative tendencies in Chilean public opinion, there might be other factors
that play a more significant role in the creation of a conservative Chilean public. Therefore, my
hypothesis, which was that the dictatorship’s influence on the press and subsequent right-leaning
newspapers contributes to a conservative Chilean public that still exists today, cannot be fully
accepted.
The analysis demonstrated that, without controlling for other factors, the members of the
Chilean public that read newspapers have a more conservative ideology than those who do not
and than those of Argentina. In fact, the results of the data from Argentina, a country that had a
similar dictatorship to that of Pinochet, showed the opposite and demonstrated that those who
read newspapers actually identify more with the left. However, when controlling for other

63

possible reasons that the Chilean public is conservative, I discovered that other factors, such as
the education, age and income levels of the respondents, actually played a more statistically
significant role in the creation of a conservative public opinion. Furthermore, it appears that no
matter what media outlet Chileans use, whether that is radio, television or the Internet, they still
have a conservative tendency, which suggests that the dictatorship’s control of the media in
general could be a reason that Chilean public opinion is more conservative today in comparison
to other countries.
In further quantitative research attempting to connect the dictatorship’s influence on the press
to the impact on Chilean public opinion, it may be beneficial to narrow down the responses for
those who only consume newspapers as a source of political information. This way, the full
impact of just newspaper readership and not multiple sources can be analyzed. Furthermore, it
could be interesting to take technological advances into account and analyze how they affect
Chilean public opinion and activism. While earlier in this paper I mentioned a study that shows
that Latin America has seen a recent increase in newspaper readership, it does not mean that the
newspaper industry is outselling other communications outlets because emerging forms, such as
social media, could actually have a bigger impact on Chilean public opinion in the future. Even
though the press was the most influential mode of communication during the dictatorship, it is
possible that even if the dictatorship’s censorship and control had a lasting impact on the
industry, it is not a true significant factor today.
To conclude, while this quantitative analysis supports my earlier claim that the dictatorship’s
control of the press aided in the creation of a conservative Chilean public opinion, it shows that
the press may not be the only reason that there is a conservative public opinion and, as a result, it
provides the opportunity to explore other reasons why this conservative tendency exists.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Through secondary research and qualitative and quantitative analysis, I demonstrated that
the Pinochet dictatorship did have an effect on the press and may still have an effect today. In
presenting Chilean history, I provided the necessary context to understand what it means to be a
member of Chilean society and accounted for other factors that may influence culture and public
opinion, such as its centrist party politics or its consistent return to military dictatorships. My
subsequent discussion of the Chilean press during the Pinochet dictatorship provides evidence to
show that the military regime’s control of the media existed and had an effect on the Chilean
public. Through censorship, propaganda, legislation and foreign and financial aid, the
dictatorship created a widespread atmosphere of fear that slowly limited the circulation of leftist
ideas and prompted self-censorship. This then led to the consolidation of the industry, as rightleaning media conglomerates were the only ones that were experiencing financial success during
the dictatorship and bought the centrist and leftist newspapers. Over time, a duopoly in Chilean
media formed, in which two wealthy conservatives purchased and still run a majority of the
communications outlets, thereby creating a lack of sources from which Chileans can receive their
information.

65

In my qualitative case analysis between El Mercurio and La Nación, the extent of this
duopoly’s control determined that, while media bias certainly existed among the selection and
content of articles in both of these newspapers in 1973, this bias still moderately exists in El
Mercurio today due to a lack of media pluralism. By using pre-determined criteria to compare
and contrast framing, word choice and circulation, I determined that, even today, after over two
decades of democracy, the dictatorship’s impact on the media during the 1970s and 1980s might
influence the presentation and selection of content disseminated within Chilean society.
In order to determine the significance and extent of this impact, I presented a quantitative
study using public opinion survey data analyzing the relationship between those who chose to
read newspapers and how they identify on the right-left ideological scale. By using a number of
different variables to account for validity and reliability, I determined that in comparison to other
nations, such as Argentina, Chile has a more conservative public opinion that appears to be
independent of which media platform Chileans use to inform themselves. In other words,
whether Chileans use radio, television, newspapers or the Internet to obtain information about
politics, those who use the media identify as more conservative than those who do not.
When controlling for other reasons as to why a conservative public opinion may exist, I
discovered that the media may not be a statistically significant factor in the creation of a rightleaning Chilean public and that education, income and age may play a larger role. Therefore,
while my hypothesis for the quantitative analysis could not be completely accepted, it does
highlight that the Chilean press favors those who are more conservative, thus affirming my
earlier arguments in this paper and providing opportunities for more research about how the
media may be important for perpetuating a conservative slant, especially among the wealthier or
more educated. For example, the data I used in this paper made it difficult to isolate for those
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who only read the newspaper to obtain political information. Therefore, conducting an
independent survey and possibly asking which outlet, channel or newspaper each respondent
uses could be helpful in performing a more in-depth analysis and could allow for analysis and
isolation of the impact of individual newspapers, such as El Mercurio, to qualify the case study’s
conclusions. Furthermore, it could be interesting to more closely examine the effects and impact
of other possible variables in creating a right-leaning public opinion and if these variables are
correlated with media usage.
While in this paper I uncovered that the dictatorship created a conservative Chilean press, it
is also theoretically possible that the dictatorship just created a more conservative Chilean media
in general. Additionally, while it appears that the conservative media has an impact today, the
extent and significance of this impact is difficult to isolate for, which provides the opportunity
for continued research into the lasting effects that an authoritarian government and a lack of
media pluralism can have on society and, furthermore, what can be done to neutralize them.
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